|
||||||||
Supreme Court Decision
Miranda v. Arizona
![]() The Miranda case does not deal widely with the rights of the accused, but rather narrowly with the admissibility of confessions. Prior to this decision, confessions had been admissible in court if they were deemed to be "voluntary", a consideration taken in totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's questioning and eventual confession. If police methods were deemed to be too coercive, then the confession was found to be involuntary, and tossed out. The Fifth Amendment, which protects a person's right not to testify against himself, was viewed as a guarantee against legal coercion -- i.e. the threat of perjury or contempt of court -- being used to extract incriminating testimony. It was not considered to be applicable to the police interrogation room where, usually unknown to the accused, the police had no legal power to enforce cooperation. Miranda was an Arizona immigrant with a grade-school education, accused by police of involvement in a rape-kidnapping. Taken downtown from his home, he was identified by the victim and interrogated by police. Initially maintaining his innocence, he eventually signed a confession, which was admitted as evidence in the trial that subsequently convicted him. What Miranda may or may not have been told about his rights is not fully known, but police did admit that they never advised him of his right to counsel during interrogation. Although his questioning had been relatively mild, and therefore acceptable under the "voluntary confession" standard, Miranda's appeal to the Supreme Court resulted in standards that his confession could not meet, and it was ruled inadmissible. In a very tense and close decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren spelled out the Court's new requirements for the protection of the accused's Fifth Amendment rights:
One will quickly see that, rather than complicate matters even further, virtually all enforcement agencies adopted the new "Miranda Warnings" almost exactly as proposed by the Court, without embellishment. Once the authorities ascertain from the suspect's response to the warning that he understands his rights, they are free to inquire if he wishes to waive them. As originally decided, Miranda did leave some wiggle room for authorities. It did not prohibit police from conducting on-the-scene questioning without the warnings. It allowed police to question suspects in their homes or offices without the warnings, as long as the suspect was free to terminate the questioning. Most of all, it did not -- though it probably would have if practical -- restrain police from acquiring waivers of rights from suspects who, despite the intent of the Court, were still reacting to the pressure of the situation. Critics have suggested that waivers should either be taped, or required to be witnessed by an attorney. Reportedly studies have shown that, in the decades since Miranda, the tendency of suspects to make incriminating statements to police has not declined significantly. Naturally the decision has opened up whole new avenues of law for criminal defense attorneys. Lately there is a fresh move afoot to try to overturn Miranda, or at least have it redefined to make things a bit easier on authorities, and a bit tougher for the guilty to escape through loopholes. Whether the High Court will accept such an argument depends, of course, on how it is framed constitutionally, as well as the makeup of the Court. Meanwhile, you have the right to remain silent ... Comment on this Decision Read Comments On this decision specifically, ... or on subject Rights of Accused ... or on subject 5th Amendment Write your Congressmen on this issue. Other decisions pertaining to Rights of Accused: Betts v. Brady [316 U.S. 455 (1942)] Stone Court Branzburg v. Hayes [408 U.S. 665 (1972)] Burger Court Brown v. Mississippi [297 U.S. 278 (1936)] Hughes Court Estes v. Texas [381 U.S. 532 (1905)] Warren Court Gideon v. Wainwright [372 U.S. 335 (1963)] Warren Court Mapp v. Ohio [367 U.S. 643 (1961)] Warren Court McCardle, Ex Parte [74 U.S. 506 (1869)] Chase Court Milligan, Ex Parte [71 U.S. 2 (1866)] Chase Court Weeks v. United States [232 U.S. 383 (1914)] White Court
|