Federalist No. 3
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS not a new observation
that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and
wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an
erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally
tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of
America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their
continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with
sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.
The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which
appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced
that they are cogent and conclusive.
Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it
necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their
safety seems to be the first. The safety of the people
doubtless has relation to a great variety of circumstances and
considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish
to define it precisely and comprehensively.
At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the
preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from
foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind
arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order,
it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to
examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial
Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best
security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad.
The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will
always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the
causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke or
invite them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire
whether so many just causes of war are likely to be given by
United America as by disunited America; for if it should
turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will
follow that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in
a state of peace with other nations.
The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either from
violation of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed
treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except
Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has
also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with
respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of
neighborhood to attend to.
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the
laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident
that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national
government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three
or four distinct confederacies.
Because when once an efficient national government is established, the
best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will
generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or
other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates,
or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and
extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be
necessary to recommend men to offices under the national
government,--especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and
never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some
of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the
political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government
will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual
States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations,
as well as more safe with respect to us.
Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of
treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one
sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas, adjudications on the same
points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four
confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well
from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different
and independent governments, as from the different local laws and
interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the
convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment
of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government,
cannot be too much commended.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the
governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and
justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and
consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the
temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The
case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this
reasoning.
Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to
resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do,
result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great
number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if
willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors.
But the national government, not being affected by those local
circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor
want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.
So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of
treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are less
to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser
ones, and in that respect the former most favors the safety of the
people.
As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful
violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government
affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be
derived from any other quarter.
Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and
interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the
Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of
the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several
instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper
conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain
or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent
inhabitants.
The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some
States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more
immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those
who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent
interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war
with these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as
a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by
the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.
But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and
settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that
respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly
than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men,
naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their
acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The
national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride,
but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the
means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten
them.
Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and
compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united
nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or
confederacy of little consideration or power.
In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge,
or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to
France, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged
to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either
have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or
Britain, or any other powerful nation?
Publius.
Federalist No. 4
To the People of the State of New York:
MY LAST paper assigned
several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by
union against the danger it may be exposed to by just causes of war
given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not
only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated, by
a national government than either by the State governments or the proposed
little confederacies.
But the safety of the people of America against dangers from
foreign force depends not only on their forbearing to give
just causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and
continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invite
hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are
pretended as well as just causes of war.
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that
nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting
anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their
nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely
personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal
affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their
particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives,
which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in
wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people.
But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in
absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are
others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on
examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and
circumstances.
With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can
supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding any
efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign fish.
With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we
suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our
carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs,
it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain than
to promote it.
In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one
nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had
in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with
commodities which we used to purchase from them.
The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent,
because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the
circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants
and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those
territories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their
respective sovereigns.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the
one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other;
nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and
us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.
From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent
with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that
jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and
cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they should
regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land and by
sea, with an eye of indifference and composure.
The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out
of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present,
and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for
operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting.
Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national government
as necessary to put and keep them in such a situation as, instead
of inviting war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That
situation consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily
depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country.
As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be
provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us
inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in
question, more competent than any other given number whatever.
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and
experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be
found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize,
assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the
benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of
treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular
interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply
the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular
part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or
separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of
system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by
putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief
Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby
render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or
four distinct independent companies.
What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the
government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of
Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales? Suppose
an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be
able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so
effectually as the single government of Great Britain would?
We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if
we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one
national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to
make it a nursery for seamen--if one national government had not called
forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their
prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England
have its navigation and fleet--let Scotland have its navigation and
fleet--let Wales have its navigation and fleet--let Ireland have its
navigation and fleet--let those four of the constituent parts of the
British empire be under four independent governments, and it is easy to
perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.
Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen
or, if you please, into three or four independent governments--what armies
could they raise and pay--what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one
was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood
and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their being
flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too
great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and
present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been
jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although
such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The
history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds with such
instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often happened would,
under similar circumstances, happen again.
But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or
confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and
money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which of
them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and
in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel
acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable
from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over the general
and common interests, and combining and directing the powers and resources
of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far
more to the safety of the people.
But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one
national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it
is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they
will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national government
is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our
militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances
discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented,
and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship
than provoke our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either
destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or wrong, as
to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or four
independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one
inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps
played off against each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure
will America make in their eyes! How liable would she become not only to
their contempt but to their outrage, and how soon would dear-bought
experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails
to be against themselves.
Publius.
Federalist No. 5
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of
the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on
the importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland,
which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two
extracts from it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid
foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and
property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies
and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength,
riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in
affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be
enabled to resist all its enemies." "We most earnestly recommend
to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the
union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only
effectual way to secure our present and future happiness, and
disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on
this occasion, use their utmost endeavors to prevent or delay this
union."
It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at
home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more to
secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within
ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general
the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by
their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it
seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be
but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three,
and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars
with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the
continental nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and
practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept
inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient
and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies
arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in
affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests,"
envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the
partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of
all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits.
Hence, like most other bordering nations, they would always be
either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension
of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot
reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing
in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first;
but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can
secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local
circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to
impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that
superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the
government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in
strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed
that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would
uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession
of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it
would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the
scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that
moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both
those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever
might promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them
from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much
time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly
dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her
neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them.
Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind
conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid
imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed
confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more
formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident
than the northern hive would excite the same ideas and sensations
in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the
southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that
its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more
blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate
neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in
contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be
borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the
contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in
short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some
nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., formidable only to each
other.
From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly
mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be
formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination and
union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to put
and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign enemies.
When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were
formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces against
a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be distinct
nations. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to
regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities
are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be
essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create different
interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to and
connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and probably
would happen that the foreign nation with whom the southern
confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the northern
confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship.
An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be
easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with
perfect good faith.
Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring
nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly
passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering
our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies
to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations, and
therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the
others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign
dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how
much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign
armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart.
How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of
allies, and what innovations did they under the same character introduce
into the governments of those whom they pretended to protect.
Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any
given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against
the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.
Publius.